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Proportionality in Customary International Law: An 
Argument Against Aspirational Laws of War 
James Kilcup 
Abstract 
 
The principle of proportionality is a central feature of international law regulating modern 
military engagements. Yet the legal status of proportionality in international law is far from clear. 
Two major international treaties—the Rome Statute and the 1978 Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Convention—address war crimes and provide distinct definitions of the crime of 
disproportionate use of force. Many of the world’s major military powers are not signatories to 
either treaty. Consequently, the only framework of legal accountability for alleged proportionality 
violations committed by those nations is customary international law. Furthermore, in non-
international conflicts no treaty law respecting proportionality exists, meaning that customary 
international law again is the only binding law available. Given the importance of the definition 
of proportionality to policing modern military conflicts, reducing ambiguity regarding the legal 
elements of proportionality would be a salutary development. This Comment, drawing on 
doctrinal and realist policy analyses, argues that the legal elements of proportionality in customary 
international law can be clarified through the adoption of the definition of proportionality provided 
by the Rome Statute as customary international law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Entertain the following hypothetical: The year is 2020 and Bashar Al-Assad 
has been removed from power. Syria is governed by a nascent democratic regime. 
In an effort to prevent destabilizing recriminations by the now ascendant Sunni 
population against Assad’s Shiite sympathizers, the United Nations Security 
Council passes a resolution calling for the creation of an international tribunal for 
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in Syrian territory since 2011.1 As the tribunal 
canvasses the claims that require adjudication, one of the most frequently 
recurring alleged violations of international humanitarian law is the use of 
disproportionate force.2 In the process of adjudicating these alleged violations, the 
jurists on this International Criminal Tribunal are tasked with giving legal content 
to the war crime of disproportionate force. Searching for the applicable definition 
of proportionality, the tribunal will find itself facing little in the way of settled law. 
No positive international law with respect to proportionality applies to crimes 
committed during the conflict.3 Syria is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).4 Moreover, the prohibition of 
disproportionate force in the 1978 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions (AP I) is inapplicable to intrastate conflicts.5 Consequently, the 
tribunal will have to determine what, if any, customary international law (CIL) of 
                                                 
1  Modeled after the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
2  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015: SYRIA, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2015/country-chapters/syria (last visited Feb. 16, 2016)(“Between February and July [of 
2014], there were over 650 new major impact strikes in Aleppo neighborhoods held by armed 
opposition groups. Most of the strikes had damage consistent with barrel bomb detonations. One 
local group estimated that aerial attacks had killed 3,557 civilians in Aleppo governorate in 2014.”). 
3  Assuming there is no ICC referral by the Security Council. In the case of referrals, ICC law applies 
irrespective of the signatory status of the referred nation. This is why Sudan was legally obligated 
to cooperate with the ICC’s order to arrest Al Bashir despite its not being a signatory to the Rome 
Statute. See Dapo Akande, Legal Nature of ICC referrals to the ICC and Its Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunities, 
7 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 333, 335 (2009). 
4  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1988). States 
Parties to the Rome Statute—Asia-Pacific States, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states 
%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/asian%20states.aspx (last visited, Feb. 16, 2016); 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter 
“Rome Statute”]. 
5  See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter “AP I”] and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional 
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 98 (1982). 
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proportionality can be applied to the Syrian conflict. Because case law on the 
subject is sparse,6 the tribunal will likely face a matter of first impression.7 
This hypothetical illustrates the importance that proportionality as CIL may 
have for the adjudication of international law. It also underscores that 
proportionality as a matter of CIL is in need of clarification. This Comment 
provides an answer to the question that the hypothetical tribunal would face. The 
definition of proportionality under CIL that should be adopted is proportionality 
as it is defined in the Rome Statute, as opposed to the definition provided in AP 
I of the Geneva Convention. 
The central thesis of this Comment is that the Rome Statute definition of 
proportionality is preferable on doctrinal, realist, and policy grounds. Because the 
legal status of proportionality is particularly important in the context of human 
shields and warfare against non-uniformed insurgencies, emphasis is placed on the 
strength of the Rome Statute definition of proportionality in maintaining the 
credibility of the laws of armed conflict while allowing for the effective and 
humane prosecution of modern asymmetrical war. 
The Comment proceeds as follows: Section II describes the current 
international regime of proportionality, both in terms of CIL and positive 
international law and concludes with a survey of the various options a hypothetical 
tribunal would have before it as it considers the question of proportionality as 
CIL. Section III establishes the meaningful differences between the definitions of 
proportionality in the AP I and Rome Statute. Section IV argues—on doctrinal, 
realist, and policy grounds—that the Rome Statute definition of the war crime of 
disproportionate force should be adopted as CIL. 
II.  BACKGROUND  
Proportionality is a moral and legal norm that forms one part, along with the 
principles of distinction and necessity, of the holy triad of the modern law of 
armed conflict.8 Contrary to popular misunderstandings,9 proportionality is not a 
                                                 
6  See Rogier Bartels, Dealing with the Principle of Proportionality in Armed Conflict in Retrospect: The Application 
of the Principle in International Criminal Trials, 46 ISR. L. REV. 271, 272 (2013) (pointing out that “no 
case law exists to which the International Criminal Court (ICC) . . . could turn were it to be seized 
of a case concerning alleged disproportionate attacks”). 
7  This situation is not entirely hypothetical. Sri Lanka is, as of this writing, grappling with the process 
of establishing such a tribunal. Like Syria, Sri Lanka’s conflict with the Tamil Tigers was intrastate 
and Sri Lanka is a signatory to neither AP I nor the Rome Statute. 
8  Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of Proportion and the “Reasonable Military Commander”: Reflections on the Law, 
Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 299, 310 (2015). 
9  See, for example, Eugene Robinson, It’s Disproportionate . . ., WASH. POST, (July 25, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/24/AR2006072400810 
_pf.html. 
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principle that limits the number of casualties one party can inflict on the other 
party by reference to the number of casualties they have suffered. In principle, it 
is entirely possible for a party that has suffered no casualties to engage in a 
proportional strike that results in the death of hundreds or thousands of casualties. 
Proportionality, rightly understood, is a principle that limits the acceptable amount 
of destructive secondary (non-targeted) effects an attack can produce given the 
anticipated military advantage from the attack. Secondary effects can include both 
traditional collateral damage, as well as more attenuated effects of an attack, such 
as power outages or environmental devastation.10 Although proportionality is 
sometimes seen as a logical subcategory of the principle of distinction—the 
obligation of belligerents to distinguish between combatants and 
noncombatants—it is conceptually distinct.11 The principle of distinction requires 
that a belligerent not aim at an illegitimate target. Proportionality, on the other 
hand, limits the conditions under which the trigger can be pulled even when that 
bullet (or bomb) is heading toward a legitimate target. Indeed, adherence to the 
principle of proportionality may require military forces to expose themselves to 
greater risk in order to avoid excessive collateral damage.12 
Given the vast variety of combat circumstances, a single detailed explication 
of proportionality would be unworkable.13 By necessity, the principle is general 
and, by some commentators’ lights, irretrievably vague.14 Nonetheless, 
international law purports—primarily in the Rome Statute and the Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention—to provide a definition of proportionality 
that guides military behavior and serves as a legal and moral standard of 
accountability for states in general, and military commanders in particular, during 
armed conflicts. A degree of ambiguity is to be expected for such an expansive 
                                                 
10  ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 19 (June 13, 2000). See also 
Commentary on the HCPR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 
http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf (“[W]hen a 
military objective is attacked, and expected collateral damage is assessed compared to the anticipated 
military advantage, the proportionality analysis also needs to take into account the expected 
collateral damage to the natural environment.”). 
11  Sloane, supra note 8, at 311. (“[T]he truth is that proportionality . . . .imposes a more onerous, and 
qualitatively distinct, constraint: arguably, it requires military forces to subject their forces to greater 
risks of death and injury in an effort to reduce collateral damage.”). 
12  See, for example, David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, in READING WALZER 277 (Itzhak 
Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 2013). 
13  As William Fenrick puts it, the problem is not whether or not the principle exists, “but what it 
means and how it is to be applied.” William Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable 
Offence, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539, 545 (1997). 
14  W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 173 (1990) (“By American domestic 
law standards, the concept of proportionality [in the law of armed conflict] would be 
constitutionally void for vagueness.”). 
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legal principle. But the fact that the current legal status of proportionality is so 
befogged is in part attributable to the fact that international tribunals have not yet 
provided direct case law on the topic.15 Which definition of proportionality 
constitutes CIL remains an open question. As is discussed Section II(A)(2) below, 
this means that the binding law for many of the world’s largest and most conflict-
prone nations is currently unknown. 
Escalating violence around the world16 underscores the importance of 
developing a sound understanding of the legal principle of proportionality. Ideally, 
proportionality could be defined in such a way that both reflects and reinforces a 
genuine international consensus and is also sensitive to the realities of twenty-first-
century battlefields. This Comment’s approach is informed by a decided 
skepticism about a morally aspirational approach to international humanitarian 
law that does not adequately grapple with geopolitical and military realities. The 
increasing proportion of civilian casualties in modern conflicts17 in particular 
underscores the importance of clarifying the legal liability for the war crime of 
disproportionate force so that the norm of proportionality exerts real influence in 
current and future military operations. 
Proportionality as a principle of international law is understood to function 
at two levels: state liability and individual criminal liability for military 
commanders. Both the academic and international legal communities have 
grappled in recent years with this conceptual distinction18—some arguing that 
there should be no distinction at all. The central focus of this Comment, however, 
concerns the definition of CIL regarding individual liability, though the analysis 
may contain implications for how CIL should be understood with respect to state 
liability. 
                                                 
15  See Bartels, supra note 6, at 272 (pointing out that “no case law exists to which the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) . . . could turn were it to be seized of a case concerning alleged 
disproportionate attacks”). 
16  Death Toll in 2014’s Bloodiest Wars Sharply Up on Previous Year, PROJECT FOR THE STUDY OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY, https://projects21.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/death-toll-in-2014-62415-update-
1.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
17  In World War I, civilians represented approximately 15% of deaths. In World War II that 
percentage dramatically increased to 65%, and in recent conflicts the proportion has risen yet again 
to over 84%. See Douglas H. Fischer, Comment, Human Shields, Homicides, and House Fires: How a 
Domestic Law Analogy Can Guide International Law Regarding Human Shields Tactics in Armed Conflict, 57 
AM. U. L. REV. 479, 484 n.30 (2007) (citing EDMUND CAIRNS, A SAFER FUTURE: REDUCING THE 
HUMAN COST OF WAR 17 (1997)). 
18  George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur 
Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 542 (2005). 
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A.  Current State of Proportionality  in Customary 
International Law 
1. The historical origins of proportionality. 
The origins of proportionality provide the necessary backdrop for 
understanding its prevalence as a state practice and legal norm. Historical 
scholarship varies in identifying the specific date that proportionality emerged 
alongside necessity and distinction as a core feature of the laws of armed conflict.19 
The contemporary iteration of proportionality in its focus on preventing civilian 
losses, however, is of relatively recent vintage. Current historians maintain that the 
modern concept of proportionality emerged sometime in the 1970s.20 
The development of the principle of proportionality in the second half of 
the twentieth century followed the advent of high altitude bombing as a tactic of 
war, which brought the population into the battlefield in a way that had not 
typically been true of historical wars.21 In past conflicts, when noncombatants 
were killed in war, it was typically because they were either targeted, victims of a 
fairly unusual accident, or broadly targeted as a class, such as in the case of a 
siege.22 When the axis and allied powers of World War II began deploying high 
altitude nighttime aerial bombing raids, they were not (necessarily) targeting 
noncombatants, but nonetheless the strikes incurred a severe human toll.23 Indeed, 
the now ubiquitous term “collateral damage” was coined in the post-War period.24 
What should be made of this? While it is true that proportionality is 
conceptually separable from the principle of distinction, the development of 
proportionality was motivated by the same underlying concern—protecting 
civilians from the machinations of war. Proportionality as a doctrine, however, 
was formulated as a response to a particular set of historical circumstances. 
Current articulations of the principle should thus bear in mind that the 
proportionality was crafted as a consequence of a recognition that abstract 
principles—in this case the principle of distinction applied to novel historical 
settings of high altitude aerial bombing—can fail to fulfill their intended purposes. 
                                                 
19  See Judith Gail Gardham, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 394–403; 
see also A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 17 (2d ed., 2004). 
20  See ROGERS, supra note 19 at 208–09. 
21  Gardham, supra note 19 at 400 (“With aerial warfare, civilians became extremely vulnerable and 
were inevitably collateral targets, potentially on a much larger scale than previously. Henceforth, 
the primary focus of proportionality was to be in relation to civilian losses.”). 
22  See ROGERS, supra note 19. 
23  Id. 
24  Collateral damage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/collateral%20damage (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
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As will be discussed infra in Section IV(C) advocates of applying the most 
expansive formulation of the proportionality principle in asymmetric conflicts 
may be missing the crucial lesson that principles need to be adapted to 
circumstances. 
2. The current scope of proportionality in customary international law. 
While the definitions of proportionality contained within the AP I and the 
Rome Statute bind the signatory states to those treaties for the scope of activities 
specified in the treaties,25 CIL is the only source of legal accountability for 
proportionality violations for a broad range of military activity undertaken by 
nations. Significant non-signatories to AP I (for example India, Israel, Pakistan, 
and the U.S.) have declared that they are bound by the AP I only insofar as it 
reflects CIL.26 This may be a distinction without a difference, as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains that the AP I definition of 
proportionality is binding as CIL,27 though others have expressed skepticism 
about the ICRC’s claim.28 
Which definition of proportionality is binding as CIL—if either—is also 
important because CIL legally binds all nations.29 Additionally, very little positive 
treaty law regarding proportionality has legal force with respect to non-
international armed conflicts, such as the ongoing conflict in Syria. The AP I 
applies only where regular armed forces engage the regular armed forces of a 
foreign state or enter the territory of a foreign state without permission.30 Thus, 
the aborted attempt by American forces to rescue diplomatic personnel from Iran 
in April of 1980 would qualify as an international armed conflict, but ongoing 
NATO operations in Afghanistan conducted with the permission of the Afghan 
government would not. The Rome Statute is likewise limited with respect to non-
international conflicts. The Rome Statute only offers applicable law for the war 
crime of disproportionate force in international armed conflicts.31 Thus, for any 
judicial body determining the legal accountability for a military commander 
                                                 
25  Though this statement is qualified by the fact that many AP I signatories included qualifying signing 
statements. See infra note 36. 
26  See Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties under International 
Humanitarian Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425, 428 (2011). 
27  Customary IHL, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 (last visited Feb. 16, 
2016). 
28  Parks, supra note 14, at 173 n.526 (pointing out that the United States has not conceded that 
proportionality as defined in AP I is customary international law). 
29  See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHT 236–48 (2d ed., 1982). 
30  Fenrick, supra note 13, at 98. 
31  Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(e)(i). 
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charged with a proportionality violation as a part of the NATO coalition in 
Afghanistan, the only relevant international law will be CIL. Only Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Convention and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva 
Convention—neither of which makes reference to proportionality—have legal 
force with respect to non-international armed conflicts.32 
Additionally, many major countries are not signatories to the AP I or the 
Rome Treaty—such as India, China, the United States, Russia, etc. All of these 
countries, however, are bound by CIL.33 Proportionality, as it is established in CIL, 
then, constitutes the only the binding law of proportionality for states governing 
at least two billion people, virtually all nuclear weapons, and many of the most 
active militaries. Because the definition of proportionality in CIL is ambiguous, 
for many of the countries that are likely to be involved in non-international 
conflict, (arguably the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri 
Lanka, to name just a few, all qualify in some respect as non-international 
conflicts), the matter of which principle of proportionality, if any, is binding is up 
for grabs.34 
3. Defining proportionality within customary international law. 
Granting the importance of determining CIL, it follows that all of the 
plausible definitions of proportionality should be considered. The following 
represent the realistic candidates for CIL proportionality as a war crime: 
a) The AP I definition without qualification. This appears to be the position of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross in its study of CIL proportionality.35 
Under the grave crimes doctrine, this would mean that even the domestic courts 
of the United States, China, India, and Israel should hold their military 
commanders criminally liable for conduct within the scope of the AP I definition. 
b) The AP I definition with qualification. Perhaps the most technically accurate 
assessment of international legal practice would endorse this option. A great many 
signatories to the AP I included signing statements that qualified their assent to 
the open-textured language of Article 51(5)(b).36 Moreover, the fact that the U.S., 
                                                 
32  GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 
120–21 (2010). 
33  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) cmt. j 
(1986). 
34  See the hypothetical explored in Section I. 
35  Customary IHL, supra note 27. 
36 International Committee of the Red Cross, Australia’s Reservation to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument 
&documentId=10312B4E9047086EC1256402003FB253 (Australia’s signing statement insisting 
that military advantage in art. 57 refer to military advantage “as a whole” and that the judgment of 
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India, Israel, and Pakistan have refused to sign onto the AP I and have indicated 
that their compliance extends only to CIL indicates that they see some gap 
between the AP I and CIL with respect to proportionality.37 The difficulty is in 
pinning down some definition that can capture the multitudinous formulations, 
signing statements, actual state practices, etc.38 If we expect CIL to constitute a 
reasonably clear and administrable rule, then a “rule” including the various 
formulations of proportionality found in the interstices of the AP I and the Rome 
Statute seems an implausible candidate for CIL. 
c) The Rome Statute. Using the Rome Statute as the CIL definition of 
proportionality has the benefit of being a clearer and more administrable rule. But 
using the Rome Statute as CIL also has this advantage over using the AP I: Article 
120 disallows states to make reservations to the Statute.39 As a consequence, the 
123 signatories to the statute are committed unequivocally to the definition 
provided therein.40 Moreover, once the effect of signing statements on the AP I 
definition is considered, the result starts to look in many cases like the definition 
provided in the Rome Statute.41 Therefore, the Rome Statute serves as a genuine 
common denominator between signatories to both. 
d) None of the above. While it is possible to imagine a CIL proportionality 
regime that prohibits more military conduct than the AP I (strict liability for 
civilian casualties, for instance) or less military conduct than the Rome Statute, 
these alternatives are significantly less plausible as candidates for CIL than those 
outlined above.42 The former may be desirable, as a normative matter. But it is too 
far out of step with actual state practice to be a realistic account of CIL. A CIL 
definition of proportionality more permissive than the Rome Statute, meanwhile, 
                                                 
military commanders is necessarily ex ante); International Committee of the Red Cross, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's Declaration to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 
1977, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&docu 
mentId=0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 (the United Kingdom expressing the same 
reservations); consider, for example, the cumulative effect of statements (c) and (i) made by the UK 
on ratification. See also Parks, supra note 14, at 174 (stating that, in reviewing a draft of AP I during 
negotiations, the U.S. Department of Defense concluded that the concept of proportionality was 
not a customary rule of law as presented in the draft). 
37  Estreicher, supra note 26, at 428. 
38  Aaron Fellmeth, Proportionality Principle in Operation: Methodological Limitations of Empirical Research and 
the Need for Transparency, 45 ISR. L. REV. 131–33 (2012). 
39  Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 120. (“No Reservation may be made to this Statute.”). 
40  Id. 
41  See SOLIS, supra note 32. 
42  For an implicit rejection of both options, see infra Section IV. 
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would be dramatically at odds with the international community’s understanding 
of the relationship between CIL and international humanitarian law. 43 
This section has provided an overview of the historical background and 
current scope of proportionality in international law, as well as the potential future 
options for CIL proportionality. The only viable options involve the total or 
partial adoption of either the AP I or Rome Statute definitions of proportionality. 
The task of Section III will be to analyze the difference between the AP I and 
Rome Statute definitions of proportionality before arguing in Section IV for the 
adoption of the Rome Statute as proper definition of proportionality in CIL. 
III.  THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ROME STATUTE AND 
GENEVA CONVENTION REGARDING PROPORTIONALITY  
Article 51(5)(b) of the AP I prohibits attacks which “may be expected to 
cause” injuries or damage to civilians “which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” as violations of the 
proportionality principle.44 The Rome Statute by contrast, offers a different 
definition of proportionality violations, prohibiting attacks “intentionally 
launch[ed]…in the knowledge that such attack will cause” injuries or damage to 
civilians “which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated.”45 Though the two definitions are 
structurally similar, the terms of the Rome Statute create a higher threshold mens 
rea, specifically through the additional requirements of intention and knowledge. 
Moreover, the Rome Statute definition requires injury or damage to civilians that 
is clearly excessive rather than merely excessive in the AP I definition. Lastly, the 
Rome Statute measures the degree of injury or damage to civilians in relation to 
“the concrete and direct overall military advantage” (emphasis added).46 The 
deliberate inclusion of the term “overall” indicates a greater degree of flexibility 
in the proportionality calculation. 
A.  The Differences Between the Definitions 
Recent scholarship has suggested that there is little practical difference 
between the AP I and Rome Statute definitions.47 The analysis below argues that 
                                                 
43  It is considered settled that the rules of International Humanitarian Law have been incorporated as 
a part of CIL. U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
44  AP I, supra note 5, art. 51(5)(b). 
45  Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
46  Id. 
47  Sloane, supra note 8, at 309. 
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this conclusion is incorrect. Taken seriously as legal standards, the difference in 
the AP I and Rome Statute definitions could have broad and deep implications in 
the laws of war. 
First, the different functions of the Rome Statute and the AP I need to be 
clarified. The Rome Statute was drafted as a means of providing individual 
criminal liability for violations of international crimes over which the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) asserts subject matter jurisdiction, including war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression.48 The AP I, 
meanwhile, serves largely as a prescriptive, action-guiding document that lays out 
step-by-step instructions for commanders and soldiers to respect international law 
while engaged in military conduct.49 But the AP I has a grave breach provision 
that obliges signatory nations to repress and treat as war crimes certain violations 
of the AP I.50 Thus while the Rome Statute and the AP I serve different general 
purposes as legal regimes, both have a retrospective criminal law function. 
As a preliminary matter, the text of the AP I may not contain a freestanding 
grave breach provision regarding proportionality. Article 85, which outlines the 
criteria for grave crimes, seemingly includes proportionality by making explicit 
reference to the language of proportionality as it is defined in Article 57. However, 
the reference to Article 57 is preceded by the following language, “launching an 
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life . . . .”51 Thus, a lawyer 
defending an alleged war criminal accused of a proportionality violation under the 
AP I could very well argue that only indiscriminate disproportionate attacks qualify as 
grave breaches. As noted above, the crime of indiscriminate military conduct is a 
related but conceptually distinct grave breach. Proportionality violations generally 
presuppose that the military commander is discriminating between combatants 
and noncombatants, but asks the further question of whether the anticipated harm 
to noncombatants of a given attack is justified in light of the anticipated military 
advantage to be gained. By limiting criminal liability for proportionality to the 
universe of indiscriminate attacks, this reading of the AP I diminishes the legal 
basis upon which a tribunal could act to convict military commanders who used 
disproportionate force. 
On the whole, the AP I is generally read to create more liability for 
proportionality violations than the Rome Statute, but at least in this respect, a 
major difference between the two could be that the AP I is entirely lacking a grave 
                                                 
48  Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5 (a)–(d). 
49  Adil Ahmad Haque, Protecting and Respecting Civilians: Correcting the Substantive and Structural Defects of 
the Rome Statute, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 519, 523 (2011). 
50  See AP I, supra note 5, arts. 85(3)(b), 85(5). 
51  AP I, supra note 5, art. 85(3)(b). 
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breach provision regarding proportionality qua proportionality. This textual 
difficulty notwithstanding, the AP I’s grave breach provision is broadly 
understood to include violations of proportionality regardless of the question of 
discrimination.52 
Another place where the elements of the war crime of a proportionality 
violation differ between the Rome Statute and the AP I is in their respective mens 
rea requirements. Under Article 85 of the AP I, for a violation of proportionality 
to qualify as a “grave breach,” it must be willful and done with knowledge.53 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia applied this language 
and interpreted “willfully” in the context of war crimes as “incorporat[ing] the 
concept of recklessness, whilst excluding mere negligence, and therefore that [t]he 
perpetrator who recklessly attacks civilians acts ‘willfully’.”54 
The Rome Statute, in contrast, requires a showing of knowledge. The 
material and mental elements for proportionality violations are as follows: 
1. The perpetrator launched an attack. 
2. The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to 
civilians . . . and that such death [or] injury . . . would be of such an extent as 
to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated. 
3. The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury 
to civilians . . . and that such death [or] injury . . . would be of such an extent 
as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated.55 
Taken in combination with the plain language of Article 8(b)(2)(i)-(iv), the Rome 
Statute raises the bar for criminal liability by requiring evidence of both intention 
(in launching the attack) and knowledge (of the proportionality violation). The 
mens rea requirement of knowledge is a source of doctrinal difficulty and raises 
questions of whether knowledge should be assessed subjectively (the defendant 
knew) or objectively (the defendant should have known). Some scholars have 
argued that the Rome Statute’s mens rea requirement of knowledge can be 
                                                 
52  Haque, supra note 49, at 525–26. 
53  AP I, supra note 5, art. 85(3)(b). (“[T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this 
Protocol, when committed willfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and 
causing death or serious injury to body or health . . . (b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting 
the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss 
of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 
2(a)(iii).)(emphasis added). 
54  Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali, Case No. IT-98-29, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj 
031205e.pdf. 
55  U.N. Preparatory Commission for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of 
Crimes, Art. 8(2)(b)(i), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/ADD.2 (Nov. 2, 2000). 
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expanded to include an unreasonable erroneous belief about factual circumstance, 
thus “objectifying” the knowledge requirement and lowering the bar for liability 
to include conduct that was done with a reckless or negligent state of knowledge.56 
However, this reading is rendered implausible by the presence of Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute which states that “[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.”57 
Another important distinction with respect to mens rea is that the Rome 
Statute’s formulation indicates that proportionality liability is necessarily an ex ante 
question. As such, the inquiry into liability focuses on the decision of the military 
commander rather than the effect of the attack, while the AP I formulation has 
been interpreted to include a results-oriented, ex post analysis.58 Because of the 
unpredictable nature of conflict in real time, there are doubtless attacks that appear 
to be disproportionate ex post that were not disproportionate ex ante. 
Consequently, an ex post analysis would likely affect the legal outcome in 
adjudications of the war crime of disproportionate force. This distinction could 
also have serious ramifications for drafting military policy and for the potential 
behavior of military commanders,59 and could therefore change the decision-
making calculus of those potentially liable for a proportionality violation—for 
better or worse. 
Another salient distinction between the Rome Statute and the AP I 
definitions of proportionality can be seen in the Rome Statute’s “clearly excessive” 
language preceding “overall military advantage” where the AP I says only 
“excessive.” The limitation of proportionality liability to cases of clearly excessive 
                                                 
56  ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 290 (2d ed. 2008) (“This erroneous belief 
about factual circumstances must be based on reasonable grounds or in other words not be specious 
or far-fetched. More specifically, the mistake must not result from negligence.”). 
57  Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 30; see also Haque, supra note 49, at 532–33 (concluding, after 
reviewing several attempts to loosen the mens rea requirement of the Statute with respect to 
proportionality that, “The Rome Statute does not prohibit reckless or negligent attacks on civilians, 
only intentional and knowing attacks on civilians, and this remains the case even if negligence and 
recklessness are relied upon as evidence of intent”). 
58  See, for example, HCJ 769/02, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel et 
al., ¶ 46, 54 [2006] (Isr.) (Justice Aaron Barak of Israel’s Supreme Court arguing that targeted killing 
operations should be subject to both ex ante and ex post investigation, citing to the precautionary 
obligation introduced by the AP I definition of proportionality). 
59  Lest there be skepticism that military commanders are concerned with legal standards in the heat 
of war, it should be mentioned that in situations of targeting, military lawyers are normally involved 
in the target selection process. See, for example, Leonardo Tricarico, Identification of Targets and 
Precautions in Attacks in Air Warfare: Operation Allied Force as a Case Study, in PROTECTING CIVILIANS 
IN 21ST CENTURY WARFARE: TARGET SELECTION, PROPORTIONALITY, AND PRECAUTIONARY 
MEASURES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 39–44 (Mireille Hector & Marine Jellma eds., 2001). 
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force opens a range of possible justifications for a particular attack; this appears 
to be have been a deliberate choice by the drafters.60 As a scholar studying the 
differences between the definitions has noted: “[t]he word ‘clearly’ implies a 
margin of appreciation, such that only in cases where the disparity between 
military advantage and collateral damage is somewhat gross and obvious will the 
offence have been committed.”61 The significance of this terminological 
difference in practice can be seen in the contrast between the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor’s handling of allegations of proportionality violations by coalition 
forces in Iraq in 2006 and the U.N. Goldstone report applying the AP I definition 
of proportionality to Israeli attacks in “Operation Cast Lead.”62 In the former case, 
the Office of the Prosecutor justified not initiating an investigation partially on 
the following grounds: 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) draws on the principles in Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention, but restricts the 
criminal prohibition to cases that are “clearly” excessive . . . with respect to 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) allegations, the available material with respect to the alleged 
incidents was characterized by . . . a lack of information indicating clear 
excessiveness in relation to military advantage.63 
The U.N. Goldstone Report, in contrast, concluded that Israeli attacks 
targeting Hamas police constituted a disproportionate use of force under the AP 
I definition of proportionality even though: 
the Mission has earlier accepted that there may be individual members of the 
Gaza police that were at the same time members of the al-Qassam 
Brigades . . . [e]ven so, the Mission concludes that] the deliberate killing of 99 
members of the police at the police headquarters and three police stations . . . 
failed to strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage 
anticipated (i.e. the killing of those policemen who may have been members 
of Palestinian armed groups) and the loss of civilian life (i.e. the other 
policemen killed and members of the public who would inevitably have been 
present or in the vicinity).64 
                                                 
60  A.P.V. Rogers, The Principle of Proportionality, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 189, 208–
09 (Howard M. Hansel ed., 2008) (by [the Rome Statute’s] use of the words “clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated,” the drafters of this article 
took into account the various statements made on ratification of Protocol I and, by adopting a 
middle way, have tried to accommodate the requirements of military necessity without abandoning 
humanity, by allowing one to look at the bigger operation picture) (emphasis added). 
61  WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 97 (2012). 
62  See Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 12th Sess., Sept. 25, 2009, U.N. Doc A/HRC/12/48 (2009) 
[hereinafter Goldstone Report]. 
63  ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Letter to Senders Concerning the Situation in Iraq, 5–6 (Feb. 9, 2006), 
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB77-4CDB2FDEB 
EF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
64  Goldstone Report, supra note 62, ¶¶ 436, 629. 
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The Report allows that an acceptable balance can be struck, but gives no 
indication that a “margin of appreciation” ought be given to the military 
commanders.65 While these two instances of alleged proportionality violations 
were undoubtedly distinct in many ways, it is clear that the decision by the Rome 
Statute’s drafters to render only those attacks that are clearly excessive in relation 
to the overall expected military advantage limits the realm of liability for 
disproportionate use of force. 
B.  Implications of the Definitional Difference  
Perhaps most importantly for the modern military era, the difference in 
definitions has an effect on the legality of military responses to the use of human 
shields in asymmetrical conflict. While the Rome Statute does not provide carte 
blanche permission for attacks on targets with human shields, its definition 
certainly expands a military commander’s latitude in such engagements relative to 
the AP I’s definition.66 
As noted above, the intent element of the Rome Statute’s definition of a 
proportionality violation changes the analysis of a commander’s decision, raising 
the bar of liability. However, while liability is less expansive under the Rome 
Statute’s definition, an attack on a human-shielded target could meet the definition 
of “intentionally launching an attack with knowledge that such attack will cause” 
injury or damage to civilians. While this formulation may protect commanders in 
situations where it is unclear whether or not human shields are being used, just 
looking to the mens rea requirements, the Rome Statute and the AP I may yield 
the same conclusion on a prototypical human shield case. 
A more categorical difference, however, may emerge with regard to the 
inclusion of “overall military advantage” language in the Rome Statute.67 This 
language uniquely invites a consideration of what tactics are appropriate in light 
of a broader view of the conflict. First, commanders facing human shields can 
argue that not being able to fire upon targets shielded by civilians provides their 
foe an enormous tactical advantage of immunity from retaliatory attack.  Showing 
that the inability to target militant positions renders a battle unwinnable or a 
broader military campaign unachievable could offer compelling grounds for 
allowing, at least in limited circumstances, attacks on human shielded targets. 
Second, it may be argued that a policy of consistently firing upon military targets 
with human shields will protect more civilians, because it will reduce or remove 
                                                 
65  Id. 
66  Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznian, Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a 
Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 126–127 (2011) (arguing that 
proportionality should be read more expansively to permit, under certain circumstances, strikes 
against targets protected by human shields). 
67  Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(e)(i). 
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the incentive for opposing militants to use human shields as a battle tactic. If the 
foregoing is true, it raises a possible argument for granting commanders latitude 
to attack human shielded targets grounded in the secondary effects doctrine of 
proportionality. The secondary effects doctrine of proportionality requires 
military commanders to take into consideration not only immediate harms, but 
broader harms such as depriving a population of access to potable water or 
electricity. If a secondary effect of strenuously avoiding incidental harm to civilians 
is an enhanced incentive on the part of insurgent forces to use human shields, 
then an overly strict definition of proportionality could itself be 
disproportionate.68 
The AP I definition provides less of an opening for flexible application of 
the proportionality principle in light of asymmetric conflict. By expanding mens 
rea liability to recklessness and localizing the calculation of the overall military 
advantage gained by a strike, the AP I formulation makes deliberate strikes against 
human shields difficult, if not impossible, to justify.69 
These distinctions matter because while the principle of proportionality is 
itself vague, there is evidence that the principle, and thus its formulation, has a 
concrete affect on military strategy.70 For example, U.S. military planners at the 
outset of the first Gulf War, in order to comply with international law of armed 
conflict, followed a multi-step protocol that required: 1) an analysis of whether a 
target was legitimate; 2) whether a legitimate target would result in the 
disproportionate use of force; and 3) whether the weapon proposed for the target 
would result in disproportionate force.71 Lest one think that such a process 
amounts to little more than a paperwork hurdle, multiple targets were declined 
because of proportionality concerns.72 The language used in international law is 
                                                 
68  I do not argue for such a conclusion here. Any argument that did attempt to reach a conclusion 
along these lines would require an intensely empirical demonstration of how the incentives of 
insurgents would change in light of greater proportionality latitude in attacking human shields. 
69 See Goldstone Report, supra note 62, ¶ 435. 
70 See, for example, Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity, 86 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 39, 42 (1992) (remarks of Fred Green, Counsel of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff) (Stating that the principle of proportionality is “well-understood and play[s] a very real role 
in decision making within out government generally and within the Department of Defense—the 
military establishment, specifically”). But cf. II INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME II: PRACTICE (Jean-Mariet Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (quoting Russian’s view that proportionality is the “weakest point of 
IHL” and that states do not, in fact, comply with it in any meaningful sense). 
71  Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War: An Overview, 
37 A. F. L. REV. 41, 59–61 (1994). 
72  U.S. Dept. of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, (Wash. D.C., GPO, 
Apr. 1992), http://www.ssi.army.mil/!Library/Desert%20Shield-Desert%20Storm%20Battle% 
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reflected in national and military law, including even the law of nations that are 
non-signatories.73 The heightened bar of liability under the Rome Statute could 
very well affect the outcome of legal proceedings. For all the reasons stated above, 
it is clear that there are significant differences between the Rome Statute and the 
AP I definition of proportionality. Those differences have the consequence that 
the AP I’s definition would hold more military conduct liable for the war crime of 
disproportionate force than would the Rome Statute’s definition.74 
IV.   ROME STATUTE PROPORTIONALITY AS CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
A consideration of proportionality through doctrinal and realist frameworks 
shows that the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality should be regarded as 
CIL. 
A.  Doctrinal Framework 
1. First principles of customary international law. 
CIL is traditionally defined as follows: “[i]nternational jurists speak of a 
custom when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up 
under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to international 
law, obligatory or right.”75 The Statute of the International Court of Justice more 
tersely defines CIL as a “general practice accepted as law.”76 Though there is a vast 
and discordant literature on what constitutes international custom as a source of 
international law, it is broadly agreed that CIL involves 1) some convergence or 
regularity in practice among states; 2) that convergence of practice is necessary, 
but not sufficient to constitute custom; 3) that there must be convergence of 
deliberate practice, not induced by force, fraud, or mistake; and 4) that the 
deliberate and volitional practice must be accompanied by a certain attitude, belief, 
intention, or disposition, which is called opinio juris.77 This final element, often 
called the “psychological” element of demonstrating CIL, proves to be the 
                                                 
20Analysis/Conduct%20of%20the%20Persian%20Gulf%20War%20-%20Final%20Rpt%20to 
%20Congress.pdf. 
73  Id. 
74  Which perhaps encourages a preexisting tendency in the media to claim war crime violations; see id. 
at 730–32. 
75  OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. I, § 17 (8th ed. 1955); see also North Sea Continental Shelf, 
1969 I.C.J. 44 (Feb. 20). 
76  See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(1)(b). 
77  See FINNIS, supra note 29, at 238. 
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trickiest.78 But as a legal formula, a practice by nations becomes a rule of CIL when 
it is accepted by nations as stemming from a sense of legal obligation rather than 
as an exercise of policy making discretion.79 
However, this formulation of CIL presents further problems when one 
attempts to determine if a particular practice or principle qualifies as CIL. For 
instance, does it matter if nations have recognized a legal obligation by explicitly 
codifying the principle, but violate the principle in practice?80 Some courts have 
answered that a CIL prohibition on torture can exist while acknowledging at the 
same time that torture is an ongoing practice in many countries.81 Moreover, just 
how universally accepted must a practice be before it can qualify as CIL?82 
Canvassing all 190 or so of the world’s nations at one time is a difficult proposition 
and has not been required for the establishment of CIL.83 Frequently, statements 
by government officials or ratification of a treaty that contains a legal norm that 
is similar to the proposed CIL norm will suffice as a demonstration of opinio 
juris.84 
2. Treaties. 
The doctrinal approach to CIL is typically defined as a “customary practice 
of states followed from a sense of legal obligation.”85 123 nations are states party 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.86 The AP I has 174 
signatories, though 40 of the signatories attached signing statements qualifying the 
assent a signature would otherwise provide.87 As an example, Canada’s signing 
statement explicitly qualifies the AP I definition of proportionality by stating that 
                                                 
78  See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7–9 (4th ed. 1990). 
79  See, for example, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1990) (“By an ancient usage among civilized 
nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, cost fishing 
vessels . . . have been recognized as exempt . . . from capture as a prize of war”). 
80  This is a difficulty, in particular, for those who argue that prohibitions against torture is a rule of 
CIL. See Mark Weisburd, Customary International Law and Torture: The Case of India, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
81 (2001). 
81  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 822 (2d Cir. 1980). 
82  See BROWNLIE, supra note 78, at 5–6. 
83  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra note 81, at 822. 
84  See BROWNLIE, supra note 78, at 7. 
85  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 33, 
§ 102(2). 
86 International Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
87 International Committee of the Red Cross, Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties
&xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
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“military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or 
executing attacks have to reach decisions on the basis of the information 
reasonably available to them at the relevant time and that such decisions cannot 
be judged on the basis of information which has subsequently come to light.”88 
Therefore, if the quantity of signatories to the respective treaties is taken as 
evidence of broader opinio juris for the AP I definition, that conclusion is 
undermined by the reservations expressed by signatories. 
3. State practice. 
Looking for general state practice on the battlefield is a problematic 
undertaking.  First, it is not clear that a practice contrary to a potential CIL 
principle is relevant when there is broad opinio juris.89 Second, military practices 
and disciplinary procedures for commanders are notoriously opaque.90 
Nonetheless, working with the imperfect information that is available, the ICRC’s 
study of CIL proportionality established that states almost universally accept the 
wisdom of the proportionality principle as a matter of public policy.91 Yet the 
study did not reveal a universal consensus regarding how states interpret and 
operationalize the proportionality principle92—which is essential to determining 
whether the AP I’s definition of proportionality is generally practiced. 
Scholar A.P.V. Rogers’ review of the history of proportionality and its 
predecessor concepts in the late 19th and early and mid-20th century concludes 
that even in cases where the AP I definition has been technically employed as the 
basis of CIL, courts have included mens rea requirements.93 Rogers concludes that 
the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality provides a far better account of 
the historical and current state of CIL than the AP I definition.94 
There is also a purely analytical reason that state practice supports the Rome 
Statute. The Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality is more likely to be a 
basis for CIL because of its more limited scope. Logically, every military act that 
violates the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality also violates the AP I 
definition. In that respect, the two definitions are co-extensive. But violations of 
                                                 
88  International Committee of the Red Cross, Canada’s Reservation to the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ 
Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=172FFEC04ADC80F2C1256402003FB3
14 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
89  See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 75. 
90  Fellmeth, supra note 38. 
91  Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, supra note 70, at 48–49, 58–59. 
92 Fellmeth, supra note 38. 
93  Rogers, supra note 60, at 147. 
94  Id. at 148. 
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proportionality as defined by the AP I do not necessarily violate the Rome 
Statute’s definition. To the extent that there is support in state practice and opinio 
juris for the AP I definition, it works as support for the Rome Statute, but not 
vice versa. Assuming  state practice generally deviates downward from the AP I 
definition of proportionality, the Rome Statute version of proportionality has a 
greater degree of support as CIL. 
B.  Realist Framework 
While the doctrinal approach is ostensibly the method by which courts 
determine CIL, academic commentators have observed that in reality courts rarely 
attempt to genuinely satisfy the doctrinal elements of CIL.95 Instead, judicial 
practice with respect to CIL evinces disinterest in an empirical canvassing of state 
practice. Courts often conflate practice with opinio juris or disregard an absence 
of state practice when opinio juris is present. Courts also appear to selectively 
employ materials to demonstrate CIL, and occasionally even hold that CIL is 
binding while acknowledging that the traditional criteria are absent.96 
Recent prominent scholarship on the topic of CIL advances the thesis that 
CIL is, on its own terms, a fiction.97 On this view, courts do not really attempt to 
determine universal practices or opinio juris98 To support this supposition scholars 
cite the assumption by courts in CIL formation that the silence of nations in light 
of a declared CIL is evidence of the validity of the norm.99 In reality, many nations 
are not aware of these putative customary laws unless and until their interests are 
directly affected by them, making a mockery of the legal principle that consent 
without knowledge is impossible.100 Scholars advancing this view of CIL as non-
consensual point to the practice of judges establishing new CIL on the basis of no 
more than mere analogy to the principles of non-binding treaties.101 
Notwithstanding these observations, CIL jurisprudence is faithful to its first 
                                                 
95  See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 469 (2000) 
(“[T]he . . . [ICJ], in most cases, declares rules of law without investigating the attitude of states on 
the legal character of a customary norm or undertaking an investigation of the actual practices of 
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96  Id. at 469–79. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
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principles in some respects, such as in the case of diplomatic immunity.102 But for 
CIL skeptics, this is just the exception that proves the rule. 
Beyond arguing that CIL jurisprudence does not take its own doctrine 
seriously, recent scholarship by Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner has 
endeavored to provide a realist, functional explanation of CIL. They argue that 
CIL regarding human rights and laws of armed conflict is in truth a mere collection 
of the promulgated preferences and interests of powerful nations.103 Moreover, 
those preferences are subject to enforcement only when the costs for the powerful 
nations are low relative to the gains in enforcement. This, they argue, explains the 
difference in the willingness of the U.S. to impose human rights based sanctions 
on Myanmar and Cuba on the one hand, while China and Saudi Arabia are free 
from such sanctions. Meanwhile international treaties and covenants, when 
effective, are best explained through game theory as a solution to the prisoner’s 
dilemma.104 But CIL does not work within the game theory framework. Because 
it derives its force from the practices and legal obligations of nations absent any 
coordination or negotiation between parties, CIL lacks the strategic basis of, for 
instance, the policy of diplomatic immunity. 
An alternative, but not mutually exclusive account of CIL suggests that CIL’s 
function is emotive and value-laden.105 This approach may make more sense of 
CIL than a focus on the mutual self-interest of states under the Westphalian model 
of international law. The function of “codifying” these values as international law 
would be to “brand” outlier states—say those states that tolerate slavery or 
torture—in a way that creates both a deterrent and a potential basis for coercive 
measures such as sanctions.106 
Taking both of these views together—that CIL is the promulgation of the 
preferences of the powerful, and that those preferences may be emotionally or 
morally motivated efforts to negatively brand nations that deviate from core moral 
principles—we gain a clearer sense of the realist view of CIL.107 However, the 
                                                 
102  A sentiment echoed by other skeptics of CIL; see generally Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding 
Effect of Customary International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 5 (2003). 
103  Eric Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 
1132 (1999). 
104  Id. at 1175. 
105  Estreicher, supra note 102, at 11. An acknowledgement of the effect that moral appeals in domestic 
politics can have in the formation of international law is not contrary to realism. See Stephen D. 
Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AM. SOC. 
OF INT’L L.) 265, 266 (2002). 
106  Estreicher, supra note 102, at 11–12. 
107  For this Comment’s purposes, an extended treatment of “realism” is not necessary. But a realist 
account means roughly an approach that explains and predicts state behavior based solely on the 
distribution of power. See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). 
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picture gets more complicated. Powerful nations are far from a homogenous 
group. Some nations with outsized military and economic power do not evince 
the emotive, value-laden desire to brand human rights violating “outliers” (for 
instance, China). Meanwhile, other nations with significant economic clout and 
less military influence are politically invested in the political project of branding 
moral outliers (Germany).108 
To determine which definition is more likely to qualify as CIL under the 
realist lens, we must ask which practices are favored by global powers, and would 
not place undue restrictions on the ability of those nations to act in their self-
interest. But as noted above, this requires some disaggregation. 
In realist terms, powerful nations without an investment in the political 
branding project, such as China, prefer to adopt as few limitations on their military 
conduct as possible. A limitation may be justified only if some other benefit—
such as avoiding the costs associated with being branded as a human rights 
violator—outweighs the harm of reduced military discretion. Clearly, this group 
of countries would prefer the Rome Statute formulation of proportionality to the 
AP I definition. For many of these countries it is consistent with their internal 
policies, such that the Rome Statute comes at little to no cost.109 For others, it may 
require a tightening of military policy, but the lost military discretion is made up 
for by the avoided losses of being branded an “outlier” in the human rights regime. 
The military practice of some nations may be significantly curtailed by the Rome 
Statute, and as such they may wish there were no proportionality in CIL 
whatsoever. But as between the AP I and the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute’s 
formulation of proportionality is a far likelier candidate for adoption as CIL 
among this class of countries. 
Those nations that are largely inactive on the military stage, but whose 
domestic politics emphasize moral and emotional concerns do not face significant 
costs by the adoption of AP I as CIL. The Rome Statute definition of 
proportionality is more likely to garner support from this power center as well. 
Part of the reason for this is that these nations are economically and militarily 
interdependent with militarily active nations that also share the moral 
                                                 
108  The term “moral” here is used in a limited and provisional sense. I do not want to imply that 
Western Europe—to generalize—acts morally in the context of CIL, while “Westphalian” state 
actors act amorally or immorally. Rather, I mean to say that something like a moral motivation is 
probably the best explanation those countries give for their desire to create standards of conduct 
that can be used to brand outlier nations. It’s possible, however, to explain the difference in 
approach to CIL through the cost/benefit analysis favored by Posner & Goldsmith above. 
109  Sweden, for instance, which made no reservations regarding proportionality in its signing statement. 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Sweden’s Signature to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), 8 June 1977, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument 
&documentId=343E4A648EC4DF2DC1256402003FB674 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
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commitment to branding outliers (for example the U.S., U.K., and Australia) but 
they would nevertheless resist the adoption of an overly stringent definition as 
CIL.110 
Meanwhile, powerful countries will not enforce something that binds them, 
and the AP I’s definition has the potential to bind the activities of many of the 
world’s active military powers.111 The Rome Statute, on the other hand, while 
providing a real constraint, is not so vague as to open military operations up to 
broad condemnation unless military commanders are clearly operating outside the 
normal rules of engagement. 
This is particularly true as nations look to the future of conflict during the 
twenty-first century. Asymmetric conflict presents unique strategic, tactical, and 
moral challenges for modern militaries.112 The conflicts are often waged outside 
of traditional battlefield settings. Non-state belligerents are typically ununiformed 
and make efforts to blend in with non-combatants. As noted above, insurgents 
actively use the civilian population tactically in order to immunize their bases of 
attack from reprisals.113 The Rome Statute definition of proportionality is well 
formulated to adjust to these changing realities. In particular, it could more 
plausibly justify direct reprisals against targets with human shields, which may be 
necessary to diminish the tragic tactical advantage gained by belligerents through 
the use of human shields.114 
The Rome Statute approach to proportionality is also more likely to garner 
broad buy-in and actually impact domestic, political decisions—an important 
realist consideration. There is evidence that international human rights law can 
have an impact on the development of internal practices, even without an external 
enforcement mechanism.115 A frequent element of international human rights laws 
that fail to accomplish anything more than symbolism is a combination of 
excessive ambition and ambiguity.116 The Rome Statute definition of 
proportionality, in contrast to the AP I, creates criminal liability for a more 
restricted and less ambiguous range of military behavior. Consequently, the Rome 
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114  See id.; see also Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part III): The Intentional Killing of 
Civilians under International Humanitarian Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 589 (2012). 
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Statute is less likely to face widespread opposition117 and stands a better chance of 
changing internal policies and practices with respect to proportionality. 
C. Policy Considerations 
Having argued that, as a descriptive matter, the Rome Statute’s approach to 
proportionality is a more plausible CIL candidate on both doctrinal and realist 
grounds, the next question is whether, as a normative matter, this is a positive 
development. The conclusion reached by this Comment is that it is, largely 
because the Rome Statute enables asymmetrical war to be more effectively and 
humanely prosecuted. 
a) Efficacy. The more permissive Rome Statute definition of proportionality 
will render military operations more effective. There is no doubt that, relative to 
the AP I definition, the Rome Statute definition of proportionality expands the 
range of military conduct that is permissible under CIL. However, a strong case 
can be made that giving militaries more tactical latitude can harm the ultimate 
success of the mission.118 This is particularly true in military engagements where 
gaining the trust and cooperation of the domestic population is an essential 
condition for victory. Look no further than General Stanley McCrystal’s decision 
to unilaterally tighten the “Rules of Engagement” for NATO coalition troops in 
Afghanistan for evidence that a restriction on military choices can be strategically 
advantageous.119 
Yet several considerations suggest that, on balance, the relative 
permissiveness of the Rome Statute allows for more effective military 
engagements. First, while there are circumstances that may call for a military to 
impose strict proportionality rules of engagement on itself in order to serve 
particular goals, such as increased goodwill among the domestic population, those 
circumstances will vary, even within in specific operational contexts. There is a 
difference between, for instance, trying to ensure goodwill in a district that has 
historically resisted the Taliban, such as the non-Pashtun northern regions of 
Afghanistan, and trying to ensure goodwill in a region like Kandahar, the 
population of which is more supportive of the Taliban. The strategic advantage 
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of more or less restrictive proportionality rules of engagement would likely differ 
in a commander’s approach to these regions. If effectively implemented, the AP I 
definition of proportionality, and in particular interpretations of its broad language 
that expand liability, would undoubtedly affect military behavior.120 As a 
consequence, military commanders would work from a more limited tactical 
toolbox.121 Insofar as we can expect military commanders to be the best situated 
and incentivized actor to pursue the most efficacious tactics, and given the vast 
variety of circumstances individual commanders face, it stands to reason that the 
greater the number of tactical tools available, the greater the chances of an 
effective approach.122 
Additionally, there is reason to believe that restrictive proportionality 
regimes lend critical support to insurgencies. Restrictive proportionality regimes 
effectively immunize areas imbued with civilians from attack, thus presenting 
insurgents—who are often strategically incapable of winning in open battle—an 
attractive point from which to launch attacks.123 In the event that military forces 
simply abstain from attacking those areas, the insurgent forces have gained a 
significant tactical advantage. But if the military forces do attack, even in a limited 
way that tries to reduce civilian casualties, the insurgent forces can count a tactical 
loss as a strategic win because of the civilian losses. Under the AP I definition, the 
military commander may well be held out as a war criminal.124 Because 
insurgencies often seek to delegitimize the ruling government over the long term, 
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these condemnations can present a greater victory than assassinations, acts of 
terror, or military confrontation.125 
b) Humanity. The Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality, if accepted as 
CIL, will better ensure the protection of civilian lives than the AP I. This position 
may seem counterintuitive, but is rendered plausible by considering the following 
factors: 1) clarity; 2) enforceability; and 3) participation. The Rome Statute 
definition of the war crime of disproportionate use of force provides clarity for 
the legal prosecution of the war crime and corollarily provides guidance to military 
commanders. Knowingly attacking targets that would be reasonably viewed as 
clearly and obviously failing to balance military advantage against civilian losses 
may not create a bright line, but it does create a legal standard that lines up with 
an unambiguous and strong moral intuition. Military commanders aware of the 
legal standard of the Rome Statute would both have reasonable discretion to 
conduct military operations and be incentivized, when presented with information 
indicating the possibility of civilian harm, to stop and consider the magnitude of 
the damage in relation to the military advantage. 
Yet it could be that increased clarity in what constitutes a proportionality 
violation will only serve as a roadmap for evasion. When commanders suspect 
that they are approaching or planning an attack that might present serious 
proportionality concerns, one might worry that commanders would deliberately 
reduce the amount of information accepted about the target so as to avoid the 
“knowledge” mens rea required under the Rome Statute. 
Though this is a possibility, several practical considerations militate against 
the widespread practice of deliberate evasion. First, military commanders would 
need just enough information to know that there are proportionality concerns, 
but not too much that the commander would qualify as having knowledge of the 
potential civilian losses. If such an epistemic space exists, it is very small indeed. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that many commanders would feel confident that they 
are occupying it when making consequential decisions. Secondly, military 
commanders have a multitude of reasons for wanting as much intelligence as 
possible regarding a potential target.126 Commanders want to be sure of the 
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enemy’s location in targeting an attack, so as not to waste resources or risk military 
personnel unnecessarily. And for reasons stated above, commanders are often 
independently motivated to avoid excessive civilian casualties for strategic 
reasons.127 
In terms of enforceability, the Rome Statute’s definition of proportionality 
has several advantages over the AP I definition. Though courts ought always to 
feel some discomfort in evaluating the real time decisions of military commanders 
from the comfort of a courtroom, proportionality is particularly challenging in 
that it requires a comparison of two distinct qualities: military advantage against 
harm to civilians.128 While the quantity of harm to civilians can be calculated by 
some objective measure, the quality of “military” advantage that justifies the risk 
of killing 20 as opposed to 70 civilians is almost non-judiciable. No artificial 
formula can answer this question (as some courts have found out).129 Given that 
fact, the Rome Statute definition provides jurists with a less ambiguous legal 
question. The Rome Statute’s inclusion of a clear mens rea requirement and a 
margin for appreciation make the legal task more manageable. Therefore, when 
the criminal elements are present, they more likely to be undertaken with 
confidence and vigor by prosecutors and courts.130 
There is a threshold question of which of the two definitions stands a better 
chance of exerting influence on military conduct. Because of the buy-in advantage 
of the Rome Statute outlined above,131 it seems likely that if either standard 
achieves widespread legitimacy in regulating military conduct, it would be the 
Rome Statute’s definition. Endless discussion of the merits and demerits of a more 
stringent proportionality regime is ultimately meaningless if the legal standard is 
met with indifference or hostility by nations and their militaries. The greatest flaw 
of the AP I definition of proportionality can be seen in the signing statements of 
so many of the signatories.132 Nations simply are not willing to constrain their 
military conduct to the extent that the AP I definition of proportionality would 
prescribe.133 As such, it remains a morally aspirational standard, which, however 
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pleasing to its authors and advocates, undermines its own chance to guide military 
conduct. 
The Rome Statute’s definition, meanwhile, presents a legal standard that can 
command broader and deeper support.134 For a nation to refuse to hold its military 
to the Rome Statute definition of proportionality is tantamount to saying openly 
to the international community that that nation reserves the right to purposefully 
and knowingly attack targets when the damage to civilians clearly outweighs the 
overall military advantage to be gained. That is, simply stated, a politically—not to 
mention morally—untenable position, and one that few countries are likely to 
take. The Rome Statute definition, then, can function as a broadly supported 
common denominator for military conduct. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
This Comment has shown that the distinctions between the AP I and Rome 
Statute matter for international law because the international law of 
proportionality affects the way wars are evaluated and ultimately fought. 
Furthermore, this Comment has argued that the Rome Statute’s less capacious 
reading of proportionality liability better meets the relevant criteria for what 
qualifies as customary international law. Lastly, this Comment has suggested that 
this descriptive state of affairs has advantages that may be welcomed as a 
normative matter. 
Laws of war must not be too aspirational, lest they become little more than 
morally self-congratulatory gestures that lack purchase during conflicts. 
Aspirations declared in peacetime international meeting rooms are too easily 
disregarded under the pressure of war. Those who would bemoan this 
development as an evisceration of the traditional principle of proportionality must 
remember that proportionality was created to grapple with a specific set of 
historical circumstances, and so it is entirely appropriate for the application of the 
principle to adjust in light of a new form of conflict. Yet the concern of those who 
advocate for a more restrictive proportionality does not fall upon deaf ears; it is 
of profound importance that the rule of proportionality does not become so 
permissive that it describes military operations without delimiting them. By 
acknowledging that this law of armed conflict must straddle the Scylla of 
aspiration and the Charybdis of cynicism, we can see that in the laws of war, efforts 
must constantly be made to correctly calibrate long-standing moral principles to 
transient legal and military realities. 
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